“Computational Ethics,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 5 (May 2022), pp. 388-405 (with Edmond Awad, Sydney Levine, Michael Anderson, Susan Leigh Anderson, Vincent Conitzer, Molly J. Crockett, Jim A.C. Everett, Theodoros Evgeniou, Alison Gopnik, Julian C. Jamison, Tae Wan Kim, S. Matthew Liao, Michelle N. Meyer, Kweku Opoku-Agyemang, Jana Schaich Borg, Juliana Schroeder, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Marija Slavkovik, and Josh B. Tenenbaum)
“Is the Constitution a Power of Attorney or a Corporate Charter? A Commentary on ‘A Great Power of Attorney’: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution” by Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,” 17 Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 407 (2019)
“John Mikhail on Universal Moral Grammar” in Philosophy Bites Again, pp. 37-49 (David Edmonds & Nigel Warburton, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)
The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 Georgetown Law Journal 1045-1132 (2014)
“Your Theory of the Evolution of Morality Depends on Your Theory of Morality” (with David Kirkby and Wolfram Hinzen), 36(1) Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2013), pp. 94-95.
“Moral Grammar and Human Rights: Some Reflections on Cognitive Science and Englightenment Rationalism,” in Understanding Social Action, Promoting Human Rights 160-198 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., New York: Oxford University Press 2012).
“Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge,” in B.H. Ross (Series Ed.) & D. M. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka, & D. L. Medin (Eds.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 50: Moral Judgment and Decision Making, pp. 27-100, San Diego, CA: Academic Press (2009)
“Dilemmas of Cultural Legality: A Comment on Roger Cotterrell’s The Struggle for Law and a Criticism of the House of Lords’ Opinions in Begum,” International Journal of Law in Context, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 385-393 (2009).
“Unconscious Choices in Legal Analysis” (Comment on Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law), in P. H. Robinson, S. Garvey, and K Ferzan, eds., Criminal Law Conversations, pp. 220-222, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).
“Constraining the Necessity Defense” (Comment on Paul Robinson, Objective versus Subjective Justification), in P. H. Robinson, S. Garvey, and K Ferzan, eds., Criminal Law Conversations, pp. 359-361, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).
“Self-Defense Against Wrongful Attack: The Case of the Psychotic Aggressor” (Comment on George Fletcher and Luis Chiesa, Self-Defense and the Case of the Psychotic Aggressor), in P. H. Robinson, S. Garvey, and K Ferzan, eds., Criminal Law Conversations, pp. 374-375, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).
“A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications” (with M. Hauser, F. Cushman, L. Young, and R. Kang-Xing Jin), Mind & Language, Vol. 22 No. 1 February 2007, pp. 1-21
“The Free Exercise of Religion: An American Perspective,” in Ein neur Kampf der Religionen? Staat, Recht und religiöse Toleranz (M. Mahlmann and H. Rottleuthner, eds., Duncker & Humblot) (2006), pp. 271-288
“Cognitive Science, Ethics, and Law” (with Matthias Mahlmann) in Epistemology and Ontology (Zenon Bankowski, ed., Franz Steiner Verlag) (2005), pp. 95-102
”Islamic Rationalism and the Foundation of Human Rights,” in Pluralism and the Law: Proceedings of the 20th IVR World Congress, Volume 3: Global Problems (Arend Soeteman, ed., Franz Steiner Verlag) (2004), pp. 61-70
”The Liberalism of Freedom in the History of Moral Philosophy” (reviewing John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy) (with Matthias Mahlmann) ARSP (Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie), Band 89/1, 122 (2003), pp. 122-132
Review of John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” 36 Stanford Journal of International Law 357 (2000)
”Toward a Universal Moral Grammar” (with Cristina M. Sorrentino and Elizabeth Spelke) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (Morton A. Gernsbacher and Sharon A. Derry, eds., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates) (1998), p. 1250
Lectures/Unpublished Papers/Working Papers
Natural Law, Cognitive Science, and Human Rights
Lecture: Plenary Lecture, 29th World Congress, IVR
The Sense of Justice in the Age of Trump
Lecture: Rousseau Lectures, University of Zurich
Ex Post Facto: A New Look at An Old Controversy
Workshops: Georgetown, Chicago, Con Law Schmooze
Implied Powers and the Tenth Amendment
Workshops: Georgetown, American Society for Legal History
Unreasonable Risk: A Formal Analysis and Critical History of Common Law Negligence
Workshops: George Washington, Georgetown, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Penn
Aspects of the Theory of Moral Cognition: Investigating Intuitive Knowledge of the Prohibition of Intentional Battery, the Rescue Principle, the First Principle of Practical Reason, and the Principle of Double Effect (Stanford Law School Thesis, May 2002)
Advisors: Tom Grey, Mark Kelman
Outline of a Research Program in Moral Psychology (1997)
The Moral Faculty (1996)
Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy (1995)
Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy: A Study of the ‘Generative Grammar’ Model of Moral Theory Described by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (Cornell University, 2000)
Advisors: Noam Chomsky, Richard Miller, Jason Stanley, Allen Wood (chair)