Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (Cambridge University Press, 2011; Paperback Edition, 2013)


“The Path of the Prerogatives,” American Journal of Legal History (forthcoming)

“The Original Federalist Theory of Implied Powers,” Havard Journal of Law & Public Policy (forthcoming)

“Moral Intuitions and Moral Nativism,” in Oxford Handbook on Moral Psychology (M. Vargas and J. Doris, eds.) (forthcoming)

Review of Shaun Nichols, Rational Rules: A Theory of Moral Learning, Philosophical Review (forthcoming)

“Computational Ethics,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 5 (May 2022), pp. 388-405 (with Edmond Awad, Sydney Levine, Michael Anderson, Susan Leigh Anderson, Vincent Conitzer, Molly J. Crockett, Jim A.C. Everett, Theodoros Evgeniou, Alison Gopnik, Julian C. Jamison, Tae Wan Kim, S. Matthew Liao, Michelle N. Meyer, Kweku Opoku-Agyemang, Jana Schaich Borg, Juliana Schroeder, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Marija Slavkovik, and Josh B. Tenenbaum)

“Does Originalism Have a Natural Law Problem?” 39 Law and History Review 361 (2021)

“McCulloch v. Maryland, Slavery, the Preamble, and the Sweeping Clause,” 36 Constitutional Commentary 131 (2021)

“Knowledge, Belief, and Moral Psychology,” 44 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45 (2021)

“The Other Madison Problem” (with David S. Schwartz), 89 Fordham Law Review 2033 (2021) (Symposium on “The Federalist Constitution”)

“The Federalist Constitution: Forward” (with David S. Schwartz, Jonathan Gienapp, and Richard Primus), 89 Fordham Law Review 1669 (2021) (Symposium on “The Federalist Constitution”)

“Two Types of Empirical Textualism” (with Kevin Tobia), 86 Brooklyn Law Review 461 (2021) (Symposium on data-driven interpretation)

“Fixing Implied Constitutional Powers in the Founding Era,” 34 Constitutional Commentary 507 (2019)

“Is the Constitution a Power of Attorney or a Corporate Charter? A Commentary on ‘A Great Power of Attorney’: Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution” by Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,” 17 Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 407 (2019)

“The 2018 Seegers Lecture: Emoluments and President Trump,” 53 Valparaiso Law Review 631 (2019)

“A Tale of Two Sweeping Clauses,” 42 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 29 (2019)

James Wilson, Early American Land Companies, and the Original Meaning of “Ex Post Facto Law,” 17 Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 79 (2019) (Symposium on James Wilson)

Presumed Innocent? How Tacit Assumptions of Intentional Structure Shape Moral Judgment (with Sydney Levine and Alan Leslie), 147 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 1728-1747 (2018)

The Mental Representation of Human Action (with Sydney Levine and Alan Leslie), 42 Cognitive Science 1229-1264 (2018)

The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523-1806 (2017)

“Chomsky and Moral Philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to Chomsky (James McGilvray, ed., 2nd edition) (2016)

The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied Powers, 101 Virginia Law Review 1063 (2015)

“John Mikhail on Universal Moral Grammar” in Philosophy Bites Again, pp. 37-49 (David Edmonds & Nigel Warburton, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)

The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 Georgetown Law Journal 1045-1132 (2014)

Any Animal Whatever? Harmful Battery and its Elements as Building Blocks of Moral Cognition, 124 Ethics 750-788 (2014)

New Perspectives on Moral Cognition: Reply to Zimmerman, Enoch, and Chemla, Egré and Schlenker, 8 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 66-114 (2013) (Symposium on Elements of Moral Cognition)

Review of Patricia S. Churchland, Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality, 123 Ethics 354-356 (2013)

“Your Theory of the Evolution of Morality Depends on Your Theory of Morality” (with David Kirkby and Wolfram Hinzen), 36(1) Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2013), pp. 94-95.

“Moral Grammar and Human Rights: Some Reflections on Cognitive Science and Englightenment Rationalism,” in Understanding Social Action, Promoting Human Rights 160-198 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks & Andrew K. Woods eds., New York: Oxford University Press 2012).

“Emotion, Neuroscience, and Law: A Comment on Darwin and Greene,” Emotion Review, Vol. 3., No. 3, pp. 293-295 (2011) (Special Issue: Emotion and Morality)

“Rawls’ Concept of Reflective Equilibrium and its Original Function in ‘A Theory of Justice'” 3 Washington University Jurisprudence Review 1 (2010) (Invited Essay)

“Is the Prohibition of Homicide Universal? Evidence from Comparative Criminal Law,” 75 Brooklyn Law Review 497 (2009) (Symposium, Is Morality Universal and Should the Law Care?)

“Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge,” in B.H. Ross (Series Ed.) & D. M. Bartels, C. W. Bauman, L. J. Skitka, & D. L. Medin (Eds.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 50: Moral Judgment and Decision Making, pp. 27-100, San Diego, CA: Academic Press (2009)

“Dilemmas of Cultural Legality: A Comment on Roger Cotterrell’s The Struggle for Law and a Criticism of the House of Lords’ Opinions in Begum,” International Journal of Law in Context, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 385-393 (2009).

“Unconscious Choices in Legal Analysis” (Comment on Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law), in P. H. Robinson, S. Garvey, and K Ferzan, eds., Criminal Law Conversations, pp. 220-222, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).

“Constraining the Necessity Defense” (Comment on Paul Robinson, Objective versus Subjective Justification), in P. H. Robinson, S. Garvey, and K Ferzan, eds., Criminal Law Conversations, pp. 359-361, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).

“Self-Defense Against Wrongful Attack: The Case of the Psychotic Aggressor” (Comment on George Fletcher and Luis Chiesa, Self-Defense and the Case of the Psychotic Aggressor), in P. H. Robinson, S. Garvey, and K Ferzan, eds., Criminal Law Conversations, pp. 374-375, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).

“Scottish Common Sense and Nineteenth-Century American Law: A Critical Appraisal” 26 Law and History Review 167 (2008)

“Moral Cognition and Computational Theory,” in Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., Cambridge: MIT Press) (2008)

“The Poverty of the Moral Stimulus” in Moral Psychology, Vol. 1: The Evolution of Morality: Innateness and Adaptation (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, ed., Cambridge: MIT Press) (2008)

“‘Plucking the Mask of Mystery from Its Face’: Jurisprudence and H.L.A. Hart,” (reviewing Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream) 95 Georgetown Law Journal 733 (2007)

“Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Vol. 11, No. 4 April 2007, pp. 143-152

“A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications” (with M. Hauser, F. Cushman, L. Young, and R. Kang-Xing Jin), Mind & Language, Vol. 22 No. 1 February 2007, pp. 1-21

“The Free Exercise of Religion: An American Perspective,” in Ein neur Kampf der Religionen? Staat, Recht und religiöse Toleranz (M. Mahlmann and H. Rottleuthner, eds., Duncker & Humblot) (2006), pp. 271-288

“Moral Heuristics or Moral Competence? Reflections on Sunstein” 28(4) Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2005), pp. 557-558

“Cognitive Science, Ethics, and Law” (with Matthias Mahlmann) in Epistemology and Ontology (Zenon Bankowski, ed., Franz Steiner Verlag) (2005), pp. 95-102

”Islamic Rationalism and the Foundation of Human Rights,” in Pluralism and the Law: Proceedings of the 20th IVR World Congress, Volume 3: Global Problems (Arend Soeteman, ed., Franz Steiner Verlag) (2004), pp. 61-70

”The Liberalism of Freedom in the History of Moral Philosophy” (reviewing John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy) (with Matthias Mahlmann) ARSP (Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie), Band 89/1, 122 (2003), pp. 122-132

”Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard Posner’s The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory,” 54 Stanford Law Review 1057 (2002)

Review of John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” 36 Stanford Journal of International Law 357 (2000)

”Toward a Universal Moral Grammar” (with Cristina M. Sorrentino and Elizabeth Spelke) in Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (Morton A. Gernsbacher and Sharon A. Derry, eds., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates) (1998), p. 1250

Amicus Briefs

Kahler v. Kansas (with Stephen Morse, Richard Bonnie, et al.)

Blumenthal v. Trump (with Jed Shugerman, Jack Rakove, Gautham Rao, and Simon Stern)

DC and Maryland v. Trump (with Jed Shugerman, Jack Rakove, Gautham Rao, and Simon Stern)

CREW, et al. v. Trump (with Jed Shugerman, Jack Rakove, Gautham Rao, and Simon Stern)  (Errata)

Bond v. United States (with David M. Golove and Martin S. Lederman)

Lectures/Unpublished Papers/Working Papers

Natural Law, Cognitive Science, and Human Rights
Lecture: Plenary Lecture, 29th World Congress, IVR

The Sense of Justice in the Age of Trump
Lecture: Rousseau Lectures, University of Zurich

Ex Post Facto: A New Look at An Old Controversy
Workshops: Georgetown, Chicago, Con Law Schmooze

Implied Powers and the Tenth Amendment
Workshops: Georgetown, American Society for Legal History

Unreasonable Risk: A Formal Analysis and Critical History of Common Law Negligence
Workshops: George Washington, Georgetown, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, Penn

Aspects of the Theory of Moral Cognition: Investigating Intuitive Knowledge of the Prohibition of Intentional Battery and the Principle of Double Effect (2002)

Aspects of the Theory of Moral Cognition: Investigating Intuitive Knowledge of the Prohibition of Intentional Battery, the Rescue Principle, the First Principle of Practical Reason, and the Principle of Double Effect (Stanford Law School Thesis, May 2002)
Advisors: Tom Grey, Mark Kelman

Outline of a Research Program in Moral Psychology (1997)

The Moral Faculty (1996)

Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy (1995)