First Series of Paradoxes
of Pure Becoming

Alice and *Through the Looking-Glass* involve a category of very special things: events, pure events. When I say “Alice becomes larger,” I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming to move and to pull in both directions at once: Alice does not grow without shrinking, and vice versa. Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction (*sens*); but paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions at the same time.

Plato invites us to distinguish between two dimensions: (1) that of limited and measured things, of fixed qualities, permanent or temporary which always presuppose pauses and rests, the fixing of presents, and the assignation of subjects (for example, a particular subject having a particular largeness or a particular smallness at a particular moment); and (2) a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad,
which never rests. It moves in both directions at once. It always eludes
the present, causing future and past, more and less, too much and not
equal to coincide in the simultaneity of a rebellious matter. "[H]otter"
ever stops where it is but is always going a point further, and the same
applies to 'colder,' whereas definite quality is something that has stopped
going on and is fixed;" "... the younger becoming older than the older,
the older becoming younger than the younger—but they can never
finally become so; if they did they would no longer be becoming, but
would be so.""1

We recognize this Platonic dualism. It is not at all the dualism of the
intelligible and the sensible, of Idea and matter, or of Ideas and bodies.
It is a more profound and secret dualism hidden in sensible and material
bodies themselves. It is a subterranean dualism between that which
receives the action of the Idea and that which eludes this action. It is
not the distinction between the Model and the copy, but rather be-
tween copies and simulacra. Pure becoming, the unlimited, is the matter
of the simulacrum insofar as it eludes the action of the Idea and insofar
as it contests both model and copy at once. Limited things lie beneath
the Ideas; but even beneath things, is there not still this mad element
which subsists and occurs on the other side of the order that Ideas
impose and things receive? Sometimes Plato wonders whether this pure
becoming might not have a very peculiar relation to language. This
seems to be one of the principal meanings of the Cratylos. Could this
relation be, perhaps, essential to language, as in the case of a "flow" of
speech, or a wild discourse which would incessantly slide over its
referent, without ever stopping? Or might there not be two languages
and two sorts of "names," one designating the pauses and rests which
receive the action of the Idea, the other expressing the movements or
rebel becoming?2 Or further still, is it not possible that there are two
distinct dimensions internal to language in general—one always con-
cealed by the other, yet continuously coming to the aid of, or subsisting
under, the other?

The paradox of this pure becoming, with its capacity to elude the
present, is the paradox of infinite identity (the infinite identity of both
directions or senses at the same time—of future and past, of the day
before and the day after, of more and less, of two much and not
enough, of active and passive, and of cause and effect). It is language
which fixes the limits (the moment, for example, at which the excess
began), but it is language as well which transcends the limits and
restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming ("A
red-hot poker will burn you if you hold it too long; and . . . if you cut
your finger very deeply with a knife, it usually bleeds"). Hence the
reversals which constitute Alice's adventures: the reversal of becoming
larger and becoming smaller—"which way, which way?" asks Alice,
sensing that it is always in both directions at the same time, so that for
once she stays the same, through an optical illusion; the reversal of the
day before and the day after, the present always being eluded—"jam
tomorrow and jam yesterday—but never jam to-day"; the reversal of
more and less: five nights are five times hotter than a single one, "but
they must be five times as cold for the same reason"; the reversal of
active and passive: "do cats eat bats?" is as good as "do bats eat cats?";
the reversal of cause and effect: to be punished before having committed
a fault, to cry before having pricked oneself, to serve before having
divided up the servings.

All these reversals as they appear in infinite identity have one
consequence: the contesting of Alice's personal identity and the loss of
her proper name. The loss of the proper name is the adventure which is
repeated throughout all Alice's adventures. For the proper or singular
name is guaranteed by the permanence of savoir. The latter is embodied
in general names designating pauses and rests, in substantives and
adjectives, with which the proper name maintains a constant connec-
tion. Thus the personal self requires God and the world in general. But
when substantives and adjectives begin to dissolve, when the names of
pause and rest are carried away by the verbs of pure becoming and slide
into the language of events, all identity disappears from the self, the
world, and God. This is the test of savoir and rectification which strips
Alice of her identity. In it words may go awry, being obliquely swept
away by the verbs. It is as if events enjoyed an irreality which is
communicated through language to the savoir and to persons. For
personal uncertainty is not a doubt foreign to what is happening, but
rather an objective structure of the event itself, insofar as it moves in
two directions at once, and insofar as it fragments the subject following
this double direction. Paradox is initially that which destroys good sense
as the only direction, but it is also that which destroys common sense
as the assignation of fixed identities.
But this is not a circle. It is rather the coexistence of two sides without thickness, such that we pass from one to the other by following their length. Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs. It turns one side toward things and one side toward propositions. But it does not merge with the proposition which expresses it any more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the proposition denotes. It is exactly the boundary between propositions and things. It is this *aliquid* at once extra-Being and inherence, that is, this minimum of being which befits inheritances. It is in this sense that it is an "event": on the condition that the event is not confused with its spatio-temporal realization in a state of affairs. We will not ask therefore what is the sense of the event: the event is sense itself. The event belongs essentially to language; it has an essential relationship to language. But language is what is said of things. Jean Gattegno has indeed noted the difference between Carroll's stories and classical fairy tales: in Carroll's work, everything that takes place occurs in and by means of language; "it is not a story which he tells us, it is a discourse which he addresses to us, a discourse in several pieces. . . ." It is indeed into this flat world of the sense-event, or of the expressible-attribute, that Carroll situates his entire work. Hence the connection between the fantastic work signed "Carroll" and the mathematico-logical work signed "Dodgson." It seems difficult to say, as has been done, that the fantastic work presents simply the traps and difficulties into which we fall when we do not observe the rules and laws formulated by the logical work. Not only because many of the traps subsist in the logical work itself, but also because the distribution seems to be of an entirely different sort. It is surprising to find that Carroll's entire logical work is directly about *signification*, implicatures, and conclusions, and only indirectly about sense—precisely, through the paradoxes which *signification* does not resolve, or indeed which it creates. On the contrary, the fantastic work is immediately concerned with sense and attaches the power of paradox directly to it. This corresponds well to the two states of sense, de facto and de jure, a posteriori and a priori, one by which the circle of the proposition is indirectly inferred, the other by which it is made to appear for itself, by unfolding the circle along the length of the border between propositions and things.

Fourth Series of Dualities

The first important duality was that of causes and effects, of corporeal things and incorporeal events. But insofar as events-effects do not exist outside the propositions which express them, this duality is prolonged in the duality of things and propositions, of bodies and language. This is the source of the alternative which runs through all the works of Carroll: to eat or not to speak. In *Sylvie and Bruno*, the alternative is between "bits of things" and "bits of Shakespeare." At Alice's coronation dinner, you either eat what is presented to you, or you are presented to what you eat. To eat and to be eaten—this is the operational model of bodies, the type of their mixture in depth, their action and passion, and the way in which they coexist within one another. To speak, though, is the movement of the surface, and of ideational attributes or incorporeal events. What is more serious: to speak of food or to eat words? In her alimentary obsessions, Alice is overwhelmed by nightmares of absorbing and being absorbed. She finds that the poems she hears recited are about edible fish. If we then speak of food, how can we avoid speaking in front of the one who is to be served as food? Consider, for example, Alice's blunders in front of the Mouse. How can we avoid eating the pudding to which we have been presented? Further still, spoken words may go awry, as if they were attracted by the depth of bodies; they may
be accompanied by verbal hallucinations, as in the case of maladies where language disorders are accompanied by unrestricted oral behavior (everything brought to the mouth, eating any object at all, gritting one's teeth). “I'm sure those are not the right words,” says Alice, summarizing the fate of the person who speaks of food. To eat words, however, is exactly the opposite: in this case, we raise the operation of bodies up to the surface of language. We bring bodies to the surface, as we deprive them of their former depth, even if we place the entire language through this challenge in a situation of risk. This time the disorders are of the surface; they are lateral and spread out from right to left. Stuttering has replaced the gaffe; the phantasms of the surface have replaced the hallucination of depth; dreams of accelerated gliding replaced the painful nightmare of burial and absorption. The ideal little girl, incorporeal and anorexic, and the ideal little boy, stuttering and left-handed, must disengage themselves from their real, voracious, gluttonous, or blundering images.

But this second duality—body/language, to eat/to speak—is not sufficient. We have seen that although sense does not exist outside of the proposition which expresses it, it is nevertheless the attribute of states of affairs and not the attribute of the proposition. The event subsists in language, but it happens to things. Things and propositions are less in a situation of radical duality and more on the two sides of a frontier represented by sense. This frontier does not mingle or reunite them (for there is no more monism here than dualism); it is rather something along the line of an articulation of their difference: body/language. Comparing the event to a mist rising over the prairie, we could say that this mist rises precisely at the frontier, at the juncture of things and propositions. As a result, the duality is reflected from both sides and in each of the two terms. On the side of the thing, there are physical qualities and real relations which constitute the state of affairs; there are also ideational logical attributes which indicate incorporeal events. And on the side of the proposition, there are names and adjectives which denote the state of affairs; and also there are verbs which express events or logical attributes. On one hand, there are singular proper names, substantives, and general adjectives which indicate limits, pauses, rests, and presences; on the other, there are verbs carrying off with them becoming and its train of reversible events and infinitely dividing their present into past and future. Humpty Dumpty forcefully distinguished between two sorts of words: “They’re a temper, some of them—particularly verbs; they’re the proudest—adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs—however, I can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That’s what I say.” And when Humpty Dumpty explains the use of the odd word “impenetrability,” he provides a much too modest explanation (“I meant... that we’ve had enough of that subject”). In fact, impenetrability does mean something else. Humpty Dumpty opposes the impassibility of events to the actions and passions of bodies, the non-consumable nature of sense to the edible nature of things, the impenetrability of incorporeal entities without thickness to the mixtures and reciprocal penetrations of substances, and the resistance of the surface to the softness of depths—in short, the “pride” of verbs to the complacency of substantives and adjectives. Impenetrability also means the frontier between the two—and that the person situated on the frontier, precisely as Humpty Dumpty is seated on his narrow wall, has both at his disposal, being the impenetrable master of the articulation of their difference (“... however, I can manage the whole lot of them”).

But this is not yet sufficient. Duality’s last word is not to be found in this return to the hypothesis of Cretus. The duality in the proposition is not between two sorts of names, names of stasis and names of becoming, names of substances or qualities and names of events; rather, it is between two dimensions of the proposition, that is, between denotation and expression, or between the denotation of things and the expression of sense. It is like the two sides of a mirror, only what is on one side has no resemblance to what is on the other (“... all the rest was as different as possible”). To pass to the other side of the mirror is to pass from the relation of denotation to the relation of expression—without pausing at the intermediaries, namely, at manifestation and signification. It is to reach a region where language no longer has any relation to that which it denotes, but only to that which it expresses, that is, to sense. This is the final displacement of the duality: it has now moved inside the proposition.

The Mouse recounts that when the lords proposed to offer the crown to William the Conqueror,

“the archbishop of Canterbury found it advisable—,”—“Found what?” asked the Duck.—“Found it,” the mouse replied rather crossly: “of course you
know what ‘it’ means.” — “I know what ‘it’ means well enough, when I find a thing,” said the Duck: “it’s generally a frog, or a worm. The question is, what did the archbishop find?”

It is clear that the Duck employs and understands “it” as a denoting term for all things, state of affairs and possible qualities (an indicator). It specifies even that the denoted thing is essentially something which is (or may be) eaten. Everything denoted or capable of denotation is, in principle, consumable and penetrable; Alice remarks elsewhere that she is only able to “imagine” food. But the Mouse made use of “it” in an entirely different manner: as the sense of an earlier proposition, as the event expressed by the proposition (to go and offer the crown to William). The equivocation of “it” is therefore distributed in accordance with the duality of denotation and expression. The two dimensions of the proposition are organized in two series which converge asymptotically, in a term as ambiguous as “it,” since they meet one another only at the frontier which they continuously stretch. One series resumes “eating” in its own way, while the other extracts the essence of “speaking.” For this reason, in many of Carroll’s poems, one witnesses the autonomous development of two simultaneous dimensions, one referring to denoted objects which are always consumable or recipients of consumption, the other referring to always expressible meanings or at least to objects which are the bearers of language and sense. These two dimensions converge only in an esoteric word, in a non-identifiable abjad. Take, for example, the refrain of the Snark: “They sought it with thimbles, they sought it with care; / They pursued it with forks and hope”—where the “thimble” and “fork” refer to designated instruments, but “hope” and “care” to considerations of sense and events (sense, in Carroll’s works, is often presented as that which one must “take care of,” the object of a fundamental “care”). The strange word “Snark” is the frontier which is stretched as it is drawn by both series. Even more typical is the wonderful Gardener’s song in *Sylvie and Bruno*. Every stanza puts into play two terms of very different kinds, which offer two distinct readings: “He thought he saw . . . He looked again and saw it was . . .” Thus, the ensemble of stanzas develops two heterogeneous series. One is composed of animals, of beings or objects which either consume or are consumed; they are described by physical qualities, either sensible or sonorous; the other is composed of objects or of eminently symbolic characters, defined by logical attributes, or sometimes by parental names, and bearers of events, news, messages, or sense. In the conclusion of each verse, the Gardener draws a melancholic path, bordered on both sides by both series; for this song, we learn, is its own story.

He thought he saw an Elephant,
That practiced on a life:
He looked again, and found it was
A letter from his wife.

“At length I realize,” he said,
“The bitterness of life.”

He thought he saw an Albatross
That fluttered round the lamp:
He looked again, and found it was
A Penny-Postage-Stamp.

“You’d best be getting home,” he said:
“The nights are very damp!”

He thought he saw an Argument
That proved he was the Pope:
He looked again, and found it was
A Bar of Mottled Soap.

“A fact so dread,” he faintly said,
“Extinguishes all hope!”
Fifth Series of Sense

Sense is never only one of the two terms of the duality which contrasts things and propositions, substantives and verbs, denotations and expressions; it is also the frontier, the cutting edge, or the articulation of the difference between the two terms, since it has at its disposal an impenetrability which is its own and within which it is reflected. For these reasons, sense must be developed for its own sake in a new series of paradoxes, which are now internal.

The paradox of regress, or of indefinite proliferation. When I designate something, I always suppose that the sense is understood, that it is already there. As Bergson said, one does not proceed from sounds to images and from images to sense; rather, one is established “from the outset” within sense. Sense is like the sphere in which I am already established in order to enact possible denotations, and even to think their conditions. Sense is always presupposed as soon as I begin to speak; I would not be able to begin without this presupposition. In other words, I never state the sense of what I am saying. But on the other hand, I can always take the sense of what I say as the object of another proposition whose sense, in turn, I cannot state. I thus enter into the infinite regress of that which is presupposed. This regress testifies both to the great impotence of the speaker and to the highest power of language: my impotence to state the sense of what I say, to say at the same time something and its meaning; but also the infinite power of language to speak about words. In short, given a proposition which denotes a state of affairs, one may always take its sense as that which another proposition denotes. If we agree to think of a proposition as a name, it would then appear that every name which denotes an object may itself become the object of a new name which denotes its sense: $n_1$ refers to $n_2$, which denotes the sense of $n_1$; $n_2$ refers to $n_3$; etc. For each one of its names, language must contain a name for the sense of this name. This infinite proliferation of verbal entities is known as Frege’s paradox. But it is also Carroll’s paradox. It appears in rigorous form on the other side of the looking-glass, in the meeting of Alice and the Knight. The Knight announces the title of the song he is going to sing:

“The name of the song is called Haddock’s Eyes!” — “Oh, that’s the name of the song, is it?” Alice said, trying to feel interested. — “No, you don’t understand,” the Knight said, looking a little vexed. “That’s what the name of the song is called. The name really is The Aged Aged Man.” — “Then I ought to have said That’s what the song is called!” Alice corrected herself. — “No, you oughtn’t: that’s quite another thing! The song is called Ways and Means: but that’s only what it’s called, you know!” — “Well, what is the song then?” said Alice, who was by this time completely bewildered. — “I was coming to that,” the Knight said. “The song really is ‘A-sitting on a Gate!’ . . .”

This passage distinguishes a series of nominal entities. It does not generate an infinite regress but, precisely in order to limit itself, proceeds according to a conventionally finite progression. We must therefore start at the end in order to restore the natural regress. 1) Carroll says: the song really is “A-sitting on a Gate.” The song itself is a proposition, a name (n₁). “A-sitting on a Gate” is this name, the name which is the song and which appears as far back as the first stanza. 2) But it is not the name of the song. Being itself a name, the song is designated by another name. The second name (n₂) is “Ways and Means,” which forms the theme of the second, third, fourth, and fifth stanzas. “Ways and Means” is thus the name which designates the song, or what the song is called. 3) But the real name, Carroll adds, is “The Aged Aged Man,” who in fact appears in the entire song. The denoting name itself has a meaning which forms a new name (n₃). 4) This third name
in its turn, however, must be designated by a fourth. That is to say, the meaning of \( n_3 \), namely \( n_3 \), must be designated by \( n_4 \). The fourth name is what the name of the song is called, namely, “Haddock’s Eyes,” which appears in the sixth stanza.

There are indeed in Carroll’s classification four names: there is the name of what the song really is; the name denoting this reality, which thus denotes the song or represents what the song is called; the sense of this name, which forms a new name or a new reality; and the name which denotes this reality, which thus denotes the sense of the name of the song, or represents what the name of the song is called. At this point, several remarks are necessary. First, Carroll has voluntarily limited himself, since he does not take into account each particular stanza, and since his progressive presentation of the series permits him to give himself an arbitrary point of departure: “Haddock’s Eyes.” But it goes without saying that the series, taken in its regressive sense, may be extended to infinity in the alternation of a real name and a name which designates this reality. It will be noted, however, that Carroll’s series is much more complex than what we have just indicated. Hitherto, in fact, the question was only about a name which, in denoting something, sends us over to another name which denotes the previous name’s sense, and on to infinity. In Carroll’s classification, this precise situation is represented only by \( n_2 \) and \( n_4 \); \( n_4 \) is the name which denotes the sense of \( n_2 \). But Carroll added two other names: a first name, because it treats the originally denoted thing as being itself a name (the song); and a third name, because it treats the sense of the denoting name itself as a name, independently of the name which is going to denote it in turn. Carroll forms therefore the regress with four nominal entities which are displaced ad infinitum. That is to say, he decomposes each couplet and freezes it, in order to draw from it a supplementary couplet. We shall see why. But we can be satisfied with a regress of two alternating terms: the name which denotes something and the name which denotes the sense of this name. This two-term regress is the minimal condition of indefinite proliferation.

This simpler expression appears in a passage from Alice in which the Duchess is always discovering the moral or the morality which must be drawn from everything—at least from everything on the condition that it be a proposition. For when Alice does not speak, the Duchess is disarmed: “You’re thinking about something, my dear, and that makes you forget to talk. I can’t tell you just what the moral of that is, but I shall remember in a bit.” But as soon as Alice does speak, the Duchess is busy finding morals:

“The game’s going on rather better now,” she (Alice) said, by way of keeping up the conversation a little.—”‘Tis so,” said the Duchess: “and the moral of that is, ‘Oh, ‘tis love, ‘tis love that makes the world go round!’”—”Somebody said,” Alice whispered, “that it’s done by everybody minding their own business!”—”Ah well! It means much the same thing,” said the Duchess, . . . “and the moral of that is, ‘Take care of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves.'”

In this passage, it is not a question of association of ideas, from one sentence to another; rather, the moral of each proposition consists of another proposition which denotes the sense of the first. Making sense the object of the new proposition amounts to “taking care of the sense,” in such conditions that propositions proliferate and “the sounds take care of themselves.” Thus, the possibility of a profound link between the logic of sense and ethics, morals or morality, is confirmed.

The paradox of sterile division, or of dry retaineration. There is indeed a way of avoiding this infinite regress. It is to fix the proposition, to immobilize it, just long enough to extract from it its sense—the thin film at the limit of things and words. (Hence the doubling up which we just observed in Carroll’s work at each stage of the regress.) But is it the destiny of sense that this dimension be indispensable, or that we do not know what to do with it as soon as we attain it? What have we done, indeed, aside from disengaging a neutralized double of the proposition, a phantom, and a phantasm without thickness? Is it because the sense is expressed by a verb in the proposition that the verb is expressed in its infinitive, participial, or interrogative form: God-to be; or the being-blue of the sky, or is the sky blue? Sense brings about the suspension of both affirmation and negation. Is this the meaning of the propositions “God is,” “the sky is blue”? As an attribute of states of affairs, sense is extra-being. It is not of being; it is an aliqua which is appropriate to non-being. As that which is expressed by the proposition, sense does not exist, but inheres or subsists in the proposition. One of the most remarkable points of Stoic logic is the sterility of sense-event: only bodies act and suffer, not the incorporeal entities, which are the mere
results of actions and passions. This paradox may be called the Stoics’ paradox. All the way down to Husserl, there resounds the declaration of a splendid sterility of the expressed, coming to confirm the status of the noema: “The stratum of expression—and this constitutes its peculiarity—apart from the fact that it lends expression to all other inten-
tionalities, is not productive. Or if one prefers: its productivity, its
necromatic service, exhausts itself in expressing.”

Extracted from the proposition, sense is independent of it, since it
suspects its affirmation and negation, and is nevertheless only its
evanescent double: Carroll’s smile without the cat or flame without a
chandelier. Two paradoxes, that of infinite regress and that of sterile
division, form the two terms of an alternative: one or the other. If the
first forces us to combine the greatest power with the greatest impo-
tence, the second imposes upon us a similar task, which we must later
on fulfill: the task is to combine the sterility of sense in relation to the
proposition from which it was extracted with its power of genesis in
relation to the dimensions of the proposition. In any case, it seems that
Carroll had been acutely aware of the fact that the two paradoxes form
an alternative. In Alice, the characters have only two possible means of
drying themselves after falling into the pool of tears: either to listen to
the Mouse’s story, the “driest” story one could be acquainted with,
since it isolates the sense of a proposition in a ghostly “it”; or to be
launched into a Caucus Race, running around from one proposition to
another, stopping when one wishes, without winners or losers, in the
circuit of infinite proliferation. At any rate, dryness is what shall later
on be named impenetrability. And the two paradoxes represent the
essential forms of stuttering, the choreic or clonic form of a convulsive
circular proliferation, and the tectanic or tonic form of a fitful immo-
bilization. As is said in “Poeta Fit, non Nascitur,” spasm or whiz—these are
the two rules of the poem.

The paradox of neutrality, or of essence’s third estate. The second paradox
necessarily catapults us into a third. For if sense as the double of the
proposition is indifferent to affirmation and negation, if it is no more
passive than active, then no mode of the proposition is able to affect it.
Sense is strictly the same for propositions which are opposed from the
point of view of quality, quantity, relation, or modality. For all of these
points of view affect denotation and the diverse aspects of its actualiza-
tion or fulfillment in a state of affairs. But they do not affect either
sense or expression. Let us take first quality, affirmation and negation:
“God is” and “God is not” must have the same sense, by virtue of the
autonomy of sense in relation to the existence of the denotatum. This
was, in fact, in the fourteenth century, the fantastic paradox of Nicolas
d’Autrecourt, the object of reprobaion: contradictoria ad invivem idem
significat.”

Let us take quantity: all men are white, no man is white, some men
are not white . . . ; or relation: sense must be the same in the case of
inverse relations, since the relation with regard to sense is always
established in both directions at once, insofar as it causes all the
paradoxes of becoming-mad to appear yet again. Sense is always a
double sense and excludes the possibility that there may be a “good
sense” in the relation. Events are never causes of one another, but
rather enter the relations of quasi-causality, an unreal and ghostly
causality, endlessly reappearing in the two senses. It is neither at the
same time, nor in relation to the same thing, that I am younger and
older, but it is at the same time and by the same relation that I become
so. Hence the innumerable examples dotting Carroll’s work, where one
finds that “cats eat bats” and “bats eat cats,” “I say what I mean” and
“I mean what I say,” “I like what I get” and “I get what I like,” and “I
breathe when I sleep” and “I sleep when I breathe,” have one and the
same sense. This includes the final example of Sylvie and Bruno, in which
the red jewel carrying the proposition “All will love Sylvie” and the
blue jewel carrying the proposition “Sylvie will love all” are two sides
of one and the same jewel, so that one can never be referred except to
itself, following the law of becoming (to choose a thing from itself).

Let us finally examine modality: how would the possibility, the
reality, or the necessity of the denoted object affect sense? The event,
for its part, must have one and the same modality, in both future and
past, in line with which it divides its presence ad infinitum. If the event
is possible in the future and real in the past, it is necessary that it be
both at once, since it is divided in them at the same time. Is this to say
that it is necessary? One is here reminded of the paradox of contingent
futures and its importance in Stoic thought. The hypothesis of necessity,
however, rests on the application of the principle of contradiction to
the proposition which announces a future. In this perspective, the Stoics
went to astonishing lengths in order to escape necessity and to affirm
the “fated” without affirming the necessary.\textsuperscript{5} We must rather leave this perspective, even if it means rediscovering the Stoic thesis from another point of view. For the principle of contradiction concerns the impossibility of the realization of denotation and, also, the minimal condition of signification. But perhaps it does not concern sense: neither possible, nor real, nor necessary, yet fated. \ldots. The event subsists in the proposition which expresses it and also happens to things at the surface and outside of being; this is, as we shall see, the “fated.” It behooves therefore the event to be cited by the proposition as future, but it behooves the proposition no less to cite the event as past. One of Carroll’s general techniques consists of presenting the event twice, precisely because everything occurs by way of, and within, language. It is presented once in the proposition in which it subsists, and again in the state of affairs where it crops up at the surface. It is presented once in the verse of a song which relates it to the proposition, and again in the surface effect which relates it to beings, to things, and states of affairs. (Thus the battle between Tweedledum and Tweedledee, or that between the lion and the unicorn. The same occurs in 	extit{Sylvie and Bruno}, where Carroll asks the reader to guess whether he composed the verses of the gardener’s song in accordance with the events, or the events in accordance with the verses.) But is it necessary to relate the event twice, since both are always \textit{at the same time}, since they are two simultaneous faces of one and the same surface, whose inside and outside, their “insistence” and “extra-being,” past and future, are always reversible continuity?

How could we summarize these paradoxes of neutrality, all of which display sense as unaffected by the modes of the proposition? The philosopher Avicenna distinguished three states of essence; universal in relation to the intellect which thinks it in general; and singular in relation to the particular things in which it is embodied. But neither of these two states is essence itself. An animal is nothing other than an animal (\textit{“animal non est nisi animal tantum”}) being indifferent to the universal and to the singular, to the particular and to the general.\textsuperscript{6} The first state of essence is essence as signified by the proposition, in the order of the concept and of conceptual implications. The second state of essence is essence as designated by the proposition in the particular things in which it is involved. But the third state of essence is essence as sense, essence as expressed—always in this dryness (\textit{animal tantum}) and this splendid sterility or neutrality. It is indifferent to the universal and to the singular, to the general and to the particular, to the personal and to the collective; it is also indifferent to affirmation and negation, etc. In short, it is indifferent to all opposites. This is so because all of these opposites are but modes of the proposition considered in its relations of denotation and signification, and not the traits of the sense which it expresses. Is it, then, the status of the pure event, or of the \textit{fatum} which accompanies it, to surmount all the oppositions in this way? Neither private nor public, neither collective nor individual \ldots, it is more terrible and powerful in this neutrality, to the extent that it is all of these things at once?

The paradox of the absurd, or of the impossible objects. From this paradox is derived yet another: the propositions which designate contradictory objects themselves have a sense. Their denotation, however, cannot at all be fulfilled; nor do they have a signification, which would define the type of possibility for such a fulfillment. They are without signification, that is, they are absurd. Nevertheless, they have a sense, and the two notions of absurdity and nonsense must not be confused. Impossible objects—square circles, matter without extension, \textit{perpetuum mobile}, mountain without valley, etc. — are objects “without a home,” outside of being, but they have a precise and distinct position within this outside: they are of “extra-being”—pure, idealational events, unable to be realized in a state of affairs. We are obliged to call this paradox “Meinong’s paradox,” for Meinong knew how to draw from it the most beautiful and brilliant effects. If we distinguish two sorts of beings, the being of the real as the matter of denotations and the being of the possible as the form of significations, we must yet add this extra-being which defines a minimum common to the real, the possible and the impossible. For the principle of contradiction is applied to the possible and to the real, but not to the impossible: impossible entities are “extra-existents,” reduced to this minimum, and insisting as such in the proposition.
Thirteenth Series of the Schizophrenic and the Little Girl

Nothing is more fragile than the surface. Is not this secondary organization threatened by a monster even more awesome than the Jabberwocky—by a formless, fathomless nonsense, very different from what we previously encountered in the two figures still inherent in sense? At first, the threat is imperceptible, but a few steps suffice to make us aware of an enlarged crevice; the whole organization of the surface has already disappeared, overturned in a terrible primordial order. Nonsense no longer gives sense, for it has consumed everything. We might have thought at first that we were inside the same element, or in a neighboring element. But we see now that we have changed elements, that we have entered a storm. We might have thought to be still among little girls and children, but we are already in an irreversible madness. We might have believed to be at the latest edge of literary research, at the point of the highest invention of languages and words; we are already faced by the agitations of a convulsive life, in the night of a pathological creation affecting bodies. It is for this reason that the observer must be attentive: it is hardly acceptable, under the pretext of portmanteau words, for example, to run together a child’s nursery rhymes, poetic experimentations, and experiences of madness. A great poet may write in a direct relation to the child that she was and the children she loves; a madman may carry along with him an immense poetical work, in a direct relation to the poet that he was and which he does not cease to be. But this does not at all justify the grotesque trinity of child, poet, and madman. With all the force of admiration and veneration, we must be attentive to the sliding which reveals a profound difference underlying these crude similarities. We must be attentive to the very different functions and abysses of nonsense, and to the heterogeneity of portmanteau words, which do not authorize the grouping together of those who invent or even those who use them. A little girl may sing “Pimpinicalle”; an artist may write “frumious”; and a schizophrenic may utter “perspendicace.” But we have no reason to believe that the problem is the same in all of these cases and the results roughly analogous. One could not seriously confuse Babar’s song with Artaud’s howls-breaths (crie-souffles), “Ratara ratara ratara Atara tatara rama Otara otara katarara...” We may add that the mistake made by logicians, when they speak of nonsense, is that they offer laboriously constructed, emaciated examples fitting the needs of their demonstration, as if they had never heard a little girl sing, a great poet recite, or a schizophrenic speak. There is a poverty of so-called logical examples (except in Russell, who was always inspired by Lewis Carroll). But here still the weakness of the logician does not authorize us to reconstruct a trinity against him. On the contrary, the problem is a clinical problem, that is, a problem of sliding from one organization to another, or a problem of the formation of a progressive and creative disorganization. It is also a problem of criticism, that is, of the determination of differential levels at which nonsense changes shape, the portmanteau word undergoes a change of nature, and the entire language changes dimension.

Crude similarities set their trap. We would like to consider two texts in which these traps of similarity can be found. Occasionally Antonin Artaud confronts Lewis Carroll: first in a transcription of the Humpty Dumpty episode; and again in a letter, written from the asylum at Rodez, in which he passes judgment on Carroll. As we read the first stanza of “Jabberwocky,” such as Artaud renders it, we have the impression that the two opening verses still correspond to Carroll’s criteria and conform to the rules of translation generally held by Carroll’s other French translators, Parisot and Brunius. But beginning with the last word of the second line, from the third line onward, a sliding is produced, and even a creative, central collapse, causing us to be in
another world and in an entirely different language. With horror, we recognize it easily: it is the language of schizophrenia. Even the portmanteau words seem to function differently, being caught up in synecopes and being overloaded with gutturals. We measure at the same moment the distance separating Carroll’s language and Artaud’s language—the former emitted at the surface, the latter carved into the depth of bodies. We measure the difference between their respective problems. We are thus able to acknowledge the full impact of the declarations made by Artaud in his letter from Rodez:

I have not produced a translation of “Jabberwocky.” I tried to translate a fragment of it, but it bored me. I never liked this poem, which always struck me as an affected infantilism. . . . I do not like poems or languages of the surface which smell of happy pleasures and of intellectual success—as if the intellect relied on the anus, but without any heart or soul in it. The anus is always terror, and I will not admit that one loses an excrement without being torn from, thereby losing one’s soul as well, and there is no soul in “Jabberwocky.” . . . One may invent one’s language, and make pure language speak with an extra-grammatical or a-grammatical meaning, but this meaning must have value in itself, that is, it must issue from torment. . . . “Jabberwocky” is the work of a profiteer who, satiated after a fine meal, seeks to indulge himself in the pain of others. . . . When one digs through the shit of being and its language, the poem necessarily smells badly, and “Jabberwocky” is a poem whose author took steps to keep himself from the uterine being of suffering into which every great poet has plunged, and having been born from it, smells badly. There are in “Jabberwocky” passages of fantasy, but it is the fantasy of an English snob, who curls the obscene within himself like ringlets of hair around a curling iron. . . . It is the work of a man who ate well—and this makes itself felt in his writing . . .

Summing this up, we could say that Artaud considers Lewis Carroll a pervert, a little pervert, who holds onto the establishment of a surface language, and who has not felt the real problem of a language in depth—namely, the schizophrenic problem of suffering, of death, and of life. To Artaud, Carroll’s games seem puerile, his food too worldly, and even his fantasy hypocritical and too well-bred.

Leaving Artaud’s genius behind, let us consider another text whose beauty and density remain clinical.4 In Louis Wolfson’s book, the person who refers to himself as the patient or the schizophrenic “student of languages” experiences the existence and disjunction of two series of orality: the duality of things/words, consumptions/expressions, or consumable objects/expressible propositions. This duality between to eat and to speak may be even more violently expressed in the duality between to pay/to eat and to shit/to speak. But in particular, this duality is transported to, and is recovered in, a duality of two sorts of words, propositions, or two kinds of language: namely, the mother tongue, English, which is essentially alimentary and excremental; and foreign languages, which are essentially expressive, and which the patient strives to acquire. The mother threatens him in two equivalent ways and keeps him from making progress in these languages. Sometimes she brandishes before him tempting but indigestible food, sealed in cans; sometimes she pounces on him in order to speak abruptly in English before he has had time to cover his ears. He wards off this threat with a number of ever more refined procedures. First, he eats like a glutton, crams himself full of food, and stomps on the cannisters while repeating endlessly some foreign words. At a deeper level, he ensures a resonance between the two series and a conversion from one to the other, as he translates English words into foreign words according to their phonetic elements (consonants being the most important). “Tree,” for example, is converted as a result of the R which recurs in the French word “arbre,” and again as a result of the T which recurs in the Hebrew term; and since the Russians say “derevo” for tree, one can equally well transform “tree” into “tere,” with T becoming D. This already complex procedure is replaced by a more generalized one, as soon as the patient has the idea of evoking a number of associations: “early,” whose consonants R and L pose particularly delicate problems, is transformed into various associated French locutions: “surt-le-champ,” “de bonne heure,” “matinallement,” “à la pate,” “déner l’espace,” or even into an esoteric and fictional word of German consonance, “urlich.” (One recalls that Raymond Roussel, in the techniques he invented in order to constitute and to convert series within the French language, distinguishes a primary, restricted procedure and a secondary, generalized procedure based on associations.) It is often the case that some rebellious words resist all of these procedures, giving rise to insufferable paradoxes. Thus, “ladies,” for example, which applies to only half of the human population, can be transcribed only by the German “Frauen” or the Russian “dMech,” which, on the contrary, designate the totality of humankind.

Here again, one’s first impression is that there is a certain resem-
blance between all of this and the Carrollian series. In Carroll's works as well, the basic oral duality (to eat/to speak) is sometimes displaced and passes between two kinds or two dimensions of propositions. Some other times it hardens and becomes "to say/to speak," or "excrement/language" (Alice has to buy an egg in the Sheep's shop, and Humpty Dumpty pays his words; as for fecality, as Artaud says, it underlies Carroll's work everywhere). Likewise, when Artaud develops his own antinomic series—"to be and to obey, to live and to exist, to act and to think, matter and soul, body and mind"—he himself has the impression of an extraordinary resemblance with Carroll. He translates this impression by saying that Carroll had reached out across time to pillage and plagiarize him, Antonin Artaud, both with respect to Humpty Dumpty's poem about the little fishes and with respect to "Jabberwocky." And yet, why did Artaud add that his writing has nothing to do with Carroll's? Why is this extraordinary familiarity also a radical and definite strangeness? It suffices to ask once more how and where Carroll's series are organized. The two series are articulated at the surface. On this surface, a line is like the frontier between two series, propositions and things, or between dimensions of the same proposition. Along this line, sense is elaborated, both as what is expressed by the proposition and as the attribute of things—the "expressible" of expressions and the "attributable" of denotations. The two series are therefore articulated by their difference, and sense traverses the entire surface, although it remains on its own line. Undoubtedly, this immaterial sense is the result of corporeal things, of their mixtures, and of their actions and passions. But the result has a very different nature than the corporeal cause. It is for this reason that sense, as an effect, being always at the surface, refers to a quasi-cause which is itself incorporeal. This is the always mobile nonsense, which is expressed in esoteric and in portmanteau words, and which distributes sense on both sides simultaneously. All of this forms the surface organization upon which Carroll's work plays a mirror-like effect.

Artaud said that this is only surface. The revelation which enlivened Artaud's genius is known to any schizophrenic, who lives it as well in his or her own manner. For him, there is not, there is no longer, any surface. How could Carroll not strike him as an affected little girl, protected from all deep problems? The first schizophrenic evidence is that the surface has split open. Things and propositions have no longer any frontier between them, precisely because bodies have no surface. The primary aspect of the schizophrenic body is that it is a sort of body-sieve. Freud emphasized this aptitude of the schizophrenic to grasp the surface and the skin as if they were punctured by an infinite number of little holes. The consequence of this is that the entire body is no longer anything but depth—it carries along and snaps up everything into this gaping depth which represents a fundamental involution. Everything is body and corporeal. Everything is a mixture of bodies, and inside the body, interlocking and penetration. Artaud said that everything is physical: "We have in our back full vertebrae, transfixed by the nail of pain, which through walking, the effort of lifting weights, and the resistance to letting go, become cannibals by being nested in one another." A tree, a column, a flower, or a cane grow inside the body; other bodies always penetrate our body and coexist with its parts. Everything is really a can—canned food and excrement. As there is no surface, the inside and the outside, the container and the contained, no longer have a precise limit; they plunge into a universal depth or turn in the circle of a present which gets to be more contracted as it is filled. Hence the schizophrenic manner of living the contradiction: either in the deep fissure which traverses the body, or in the fragmented parts which encase one another and spin about. Body-sieve, fragmented body, and dissociated body—these are the three primary dimensions of the schizophrenic body.

In this collapse of the surface, the entire world loses its meaning. It maintains perhaps a certain power of denotation, but this is experienced as empty. It maintains a certain power of manifestation, but this is experienced as indifferent. And it maintains a certain signification, experienced as "false." Nevertheless, the word loses its sense, that is, its power to draw together or to express an incorporeal effect distinct from the actions and passions of the body, and an ideational event distinct from its present realization. Every event is realized, be it in a hallucinatory form. Every word is physical, and immediately affects the body. The procedure is this: a word, often of an alimentary nature, appears in capital letters, printed as in a collage which freezes it and strips it of its sense. But the moment that the pinned-down word loses its sense, it bursts into pieces; it is decomposed into syllables, letters, and above all into consonants which act directly on the body, penetrating and bruising it. We have already seen that this was the case for the
schizophrenic student of languages. The moment that the maternal language is stripped of its sense, its phonetic elements become singularly wounding. The word no longer expresses an attribute of the state of affairs; its fragments merge with unbearable sonorous qualities, invade the body where they form a mixture and a new state of affairs, as if they themselves were a noisy, poisonous food and canned excrement. The parts of the body, its organs, are determined in virtue of decomposed elements which affect and assail them. In this passion, a pure language-ffect is substituted for the effect of language: "All writing is PIG SHIT" (that is to say, every fixed or written word is decomposed into noisy, alimentary, and excremental bits).

For the schizophrenic, then, it is less a question of recovering meaning than of destroying the word, of conjuring up the affect, and of transforming the painful passion of the body into a triumphant action, obedience into command, always in this depth beneath the fissured surface. The student of languages provides the example of the means by which the painful explosions of the word in the maternal language are converted into actions relative to the foreign languages. We saw a little while ago that wounding was accomplished by means of phonetic elements affecting the articulated or disarticulated parts of the body. Triumph may now be reached only through the creation of breath-words (mots-souffles) and howl-words (mots-cris), in which all literal, syllabic, and phonetic values have been replaced by values which are exclusively tonic and not written. To these values a glorious body corresponds, being a new dimension of the schizophrenic body, an organism without parts which operates entirely by insufflation, respiration, evaporation, and fluid transmission (the superior body or body without organs of Antonin Artaud). Undoubtedly, this characterization of the active procedure, in opposition to the procedure of passion, appears initially insufficient: fluids, in fact, do not seem less harmful than fragments. But this is so because of the action-passion ambivalence. It is here that the contradiction lived in schizophrenia finds its real point of application: passion and action are the inseparable poles of an ambivalence, because the two languages which they form belong inseparably to the body and to the depth of bodies. One is thus never sure that the ideal fluids of an organism without parts does not carry parasitic worms, fragments of organs, solid food, and excremental residue. In fact, it is certain that the maleficent forces make effective use of fluids and insufflations in order to introduce bits of passion into the body. The fluid is necessarily corrupted, but not by itself. It is corrupted only by the other pole from which it cannot be separated. The fact, though, is that it represents the active pole and the state of perfect mixture. The latter is opposed to the encasings and bruisings of the imperfect mixtures which represent the passive pole. In schizophrenia, there is a way of living the Stoic distinction between two corporeal mixtures: the partial mixture which alters the body, and the total and liquid mixture which leaves the body intact. In the fluid element, or in the insufflated liquid, there is the unwritten secret of an active mixture which is like the "principle of the Sea," in opposition to the passive mixtures of the encased parts. It is in this sense that Artaud transforms Humpty Dumpty's poem about the sea and the fish into a poem about the problem of obedience and command.

What defines this second language and this method of action, practically, is its consonantal, guttural, and aspirated overloads, its apostrophes and internal accents, its breaths and its scissions, and its modulation which replaces all syllabic or even literal values. It is a question of transforming the word into an action by rendering it incapable of being decomposed and incapable of disintegrating: language without articulation. The cement here is a palatalized, an-organic principle, a sea-block or a sea-mass. With respect to the Russian word "derevo" ("tree") the student of language is overjoyed at the existence of a plural form derev'yay—whose internal apostrophe seems to assure the fusion of consonants (the linguist's soft sign). Rather than separating the consonants and rendering them pronouncable, one could say that the vowel, once reduced to the soft sign, renders the consonants indissociable from one another, by palatalizing them. It leaves them illegible and even unpronouncable, as it transforms them into so many active howls in one continuous breath. These howls are welded together in breath, like the consonants in the sign which liquefies them, like fish in the ocean-mass, or like the bones in the blood of the body without organs. A sign of fire, a wave "which hesitates between gas and water," said Artaud. The howls are gurglings in breath.

When Artaud says in his "Jabberwocky" "Until rough is to rouarge has rangmblde and rangmblde has ouaraghambde," he means to activate, insufflate, palatalize, and set the word afame so that the word becomes the action of a body without parts, instead of being the passion of a
fragmented organism. The task is that of transforming the word into a fusion of consonants—fusion through the use of soft signs and of consonants which cannot be decomposed. Within this language, one can always find words which would be equivalent to portmanteau words. For “rougue,” and “rougigue,” Artaud himself indicates “rouze,” “rouze,” “route,” “rège,” or “route à régler.” To this list, we could add “Rouergue,” that section of Rodez in which Artaud was at the time. Likewise, when he says “Uk’hatis,” with an internal apostrophe, he indicates “uhhose,” “hûte,” and “ubruti,” and adds “a nocturnal jolt beneath Hecate which means the pigs of the moon thrown off the straight path.” As soon as the word appears, however, as a portmanteau word, its structure and the commentary attached to it persuade us of the presence of something very different. Artaud’s “Ghoré Uk’hatis” are not equivalent to the lost pigs, to Carroll’s “mome raths,” or to Parisot’s “verchons fourous.” They do not compete with them on the same plane. They do not secure the ramification of series on the basis of sense. On the contrary, they enact a chain of associations between tonic and consonantal elements, in a region of infra-sense, according to a fluid and burning principle which absorbs and reabsorbs effectively the sense as soon as it is produced: Uk’hatis (or the lost pigs of the moon) is K’H (chah = jolt), ’KT (nocturnal), and H’KT (Hecate).

The duality of the schizophrenic word has not been adequately noted: it comprises the passion-word, which explodes into wounding phonetic values, and the action-word, which welds inarticulate tonic values. These two words are developed in relation to the duality of the body, fragmented body and body without organs. They refer to two theaters, the theater of terror or passion and the theater of cruelty, which is by its essence active. They refer to two types of nonsense, passive and active: the nonsense of the word devoid of sense, which is decomposed into phonetic elements; and the nonsense of tonic elements, which form a word incapable of being decomposed and no less devoid of sense. Here everything happens, acts and is acted upon, beneath sense and far from the surface. Sub-sense, a-sense, Untersinn—this must be distinguished from the nonsense of the surface. According to Hölderlin, language in its two aspects is “a sign empty of meaning.” Although a sign, it is a sign which merges with an action or a passion of the body.¹⁰ This is why it seems entirely insufficient to say that schizophrenic language is defined by an endless and panic-stricken sliding of the signifying series toward the signified series. In fact, there are no longer any series at all; the two series have disappeared. Nonsense has ceased to give sense to the surface; it absorbs and engulfs all sense, both on the side of the signifier and on the side of the signified. Artaud says that Being, which is nonsense, has teeth. In the surface organization which we called secondary, physical bodies and sonorous words are separated and articulated at once by an incorporeal frontier. This frontier is sense, representing, on one side, the pure “expressed” or words, and on the other, the logical attribute of bodies. Although sense results from the actions and the passions of the body, it is a result which differs in nature, since it is neither action nor passion. It is a result which shelters sonorous language from any confusion with the physical body. On the contrary, in this primary order of schizophrenia, the only duality left is that between the actions and the passions of the body. Language is both at once, being entirely reabsorbed into the gaping depth. There is no longer anything to prevent propositions from falling back onto bodies and from mingling their sonorous elements with the body’s olfactory, gustatory, or digestive affects. Not only is there no longer any sense, but there is no longer any grammar or syntax either—nor, at the limit, are there any articulated syllabic, literal, or phonetic elements. Antonin Artaud could have entitled his essay “An Antigrammatical Effort Against Lewis Carroll.” Carroll needs a very strict grammar, required to conserve the inflection and articulation of words, and to distinguish them from the inflection and articulation of bodies, were it only through the mirror which reflects them and sends a meaning back to them.¹¹ It is for this reason that we can oppose Artaud and Carroll point for point—primary order and secondary organization. The surface series of the “to eat/to speak” type have really nothing in common with the poles of depth which are only apparently similar. The two figures of nonsense at the surface, which distribute sense between the series, have nothing to do with the two dives into nonsense which drag along, engulf, and reabsorb sense (Untersinn). The two forms of stuttering, the clonic and the tonic, are only roughly analogous to the two schizophrenic languages. The break (coupure) of the surface has nothing in common with the deep Spaltung. The contradiction which was grasped in an infinite subdivision of the past-future over the in-
Notes

FIRST SERIES OF PARADOXES OF PURE BECOMING

2. Plato, Cratylus, 437ff. With respect to the preceding, see appendix 1.

SECOND SERIES OF PARADOXES OF SURFACE EFFECTS

2. On this example, see the commentary of Brehier, p. 20.
3. On the distinction between real internal causes and external causes entering into limited relations of “confatality,” see Cicero, De Fato, 9, 13, 15, and 16.
4. The Epicurean notion of the event is very similar to that of the Stoics: Epicurus, To Herodous, 39–40, 68–73; and Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 1:449ff. As he analyzes the event, “the rape of Tyndareus’ daughter . . . .” Lucretius contrasts eventa (servitude-liberty), poverty-wealth, war-peace) with conjuncta (real qualities which are inseparable from bodies). Events are not exactly incorporeal entities. They are presented nevertheless as not existing by themselves—impassible, pure results of the movements of matter, or actions and passions of bodies. It does not seem likely
though that the Epicureans developed this theory of the event—perhaps because they bent it to the demands of a homogeneous causality and subsumed it under their own conception of the simulacrum. See appendix 2.

5. On the account of Stoic categories, see Plotinus, 6.1.25. See also Bréhier, p. 43.

6. This description of the purse comprises some of Carroll's best writing: _Syrie and Bruno Concluded_, ch. 7.

7. This discovery of the surface and this critique of depth represent a constant in modern literature. They inspire the work of Robbe-Grillet. In another form, we find them again in Klossowski, in the relation between Roberte's epidermis and her glove: see Klossowski's remarks to this effect in the postface to _Lois de l'hospitalité_. pp. 133, 344; see also Michel Tournier's _Friday_, trans. Norman Denny (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, by arrangement with Doubleday), p. 67: "It is a strange prejudice which sets a higher value on depth than on breadth, and which accepts 'superficial' as meaning not 'of wide extent' but 'of little depth,' whereas 'deep,' on the other hand, signifies 'of great depth,' and not 'of small surface.' Yet it seems to me that a feeling such as love is better measured, if it can be measured at all, by the extent of its surface than by its degree of depth." See appendixes 3 and 4.

THIRD SERIES OF THE PROPOSITION

1. See the theory of "connectors" (embrayeurs) as presented by Benveniste in _Problèmes de linguistique générale_ (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), ch. 26. We separate "tomorrow" from yesterday or today, since "tomorrow" is first of all an expression of belief and has only a secondary indicative value.

2. For example, when Brice Parain opposes denomination (denotation) and demonstration (signification), he understands "demonstration" in a manner that encompasses the moral sense of a program to be fulfilled, a promise to be kept, a possibility to be realized—as, for example, in a "demonstration of love" or a phrase such as "I will love you always." See _Recherches sur la nature et les fonctions du langage_ (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), ch. 5.


5. Brice Parain, ch. 3.


7. ibid., p. 179: "We may say that whatever is asserted by a significant sentence has a certain kind of possibility."

8. Hubert Elle, in an excellent book, _La Complexe significable_ (Paris: Vrin, 1936), exposes and comments on the doctrines of Gregory of Rimini and Nicolas d'Autrecourt. He points out the extreme resemblance to Meinong's theories, and how a similar polemic was repeated in both the nineteenth and fourteenth centuries. He does not, however, indicate the Stoic origin of the problem.

9. On the Stoic differentiation of incorporeal entities and rational representations, composed of corporeal traces, see E. Bréhier, pp. 16–18.

10. See Albert Lautman's remarks on the subject of the Mbius strip: it has "but a single side, which is essentially an extrinsic property, since in order to give an account of it the strip must be broken and untwisted. This presupposes of course a rotation around an axis external to the surface of the strip. Yet it is also possible to characterize this unilaterality by means of a purely intrinsic property. . . ." _Essai sur les notions de structure et d'existence en mathématiques_ (Paris: Hermann, 1938), 154.

11. We do not have in mind here the particular use Husserl makes of "signification" in his terminology, either to identify it or to bind it to "sense."

12. These terms, "inheritance" and "extra-Being," have their correlates in Meinong's terminology as well as in that of the Stoics.


FOURTH SERIES OF DUALITIES


FIFTH SERIES OF SENSE

1. See G. Frege, _Über Sinn und Bedeutung_, Zeitschrift f. Ph. und ph. Kr., 1892. This principle of an infinite proliferation of entities has evoked little

2. The translation here omits a clause of the original text. The original text is as follows: “This passage, which was translated very inelegantly in order to be faithful to Carroll’s terminology, distinguishes a series of nominal entities.” Tr. note.


SIXTH SERIES ON SERIALIZATION


2. See Michel Foucault, Raymond Roussel (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), ch. 2; with respect to series, see in particular pp. 280ff.


SEVENTH SERIES OF ESOTERIC WORDS


2. Both Henri Parisot and Jacques B. Brunius have produced fine (French) translations of “Jabberwocky.” Parisot’s is reproduced in his Lewis Carroll; Brunius’, along with a commentary on the words in the poem, can be found in the Cahiers du Sud (1948), no. 287. Both authors also cite versions of “Jabberwocky” in diverse languages. We borrow the terms that we use sometimes from Parisot, sometimes from Brunius. Antonin Artaud’s translation of the first stanza of the poem will be considered later, as this admirable text poses problems which no longer pertain to Carroll.


EIGHTH SERIES OF STRUCTURE


2. The parallel with differential calculus may seem both arbitrary and old-fashioned. But what is old-fashioned is only the infinitist interpretation of calculus. Already at the end of the nineteenth century, Weirstrass gave a finite interpretation, ordinal and static, very close to a mathematical structuralism. The theme of singularities remains an essential piece of the theory of differential equations. The best study of the history of the differential calculus and its modern structural interpretation is C. B. Boyer’s The History of the Calculus and Its Conceptual Development (New York: Dover, 1959).

NINTH SERIES OF THE PROBLEMATIC

1. Earlier, “neutral” sense seemed to us to be opposed to the singular no less than to the other modalities. For singularity was defined only in relation to denotation and manifestation; the singular was defined as individual or personal, not as punctual. Now, however, singularity belongs to the neutral domain.


NINTH SERIES OF THE PROBLEMATIC

Péguy, in his own way, had seen the essential relation of the event or singularity with the categories of problem and solution: see Péguy, p. 269: "... and a problem whose end we could not see, a problem without a way out ..." etc.

6. The Dynamics of a Parle-clé.

TENTH SERIES OF THE IDEAL GAME

1. On the idea of a time smaller than the minimum of continuous time, see appendix 2.

2. J. L. Borges, Ficciones (New York: Grove Press, 1962), pp. 69–70. The parable of the tortoise and the hare seems to be an allusion not only to Zeno's paradox but to Carroll's as well, which we have already considered, and which Borges takes up anew in Other Inquisitions (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964).

3. J. L. Borges, Ficciones, p. 141. In his Historia de la eternidad, Borges does not go so far and seems to conceive of the labyrinth as only circular or cyclical.

Among the commentators of Stoic thought, Victor Goldschmidt in particular has analyzed the coexistence of these two conceptions of time: the first, of variable presents; the second, of unlimited subdivision into past and future. Le Système stoïcien et l'idée de temps (Paris: Vrin, 1953), pp. 36–40. He also demonstrates that there exist for the Stoics two methods and two moral attitudes. But whether these two attitudes correspond to the two times is still obscure: it does not seem so, according to the author's comments. Moreover, the question of two very different eternal returns, themselves corresponding to the two times, does not appear (at least directly) in Stoic thought. We shall return to these points.


5. Le Livre de Mallarmé (Paris: Gallimard, 1978): see Jacques Scherer's study of the "book's" structure, and notably his comments on the four fragments (pp. 137–138). It does not seem, however, in spite of the places at which the two works meet and in spite of certain common problems, that Mallarmé knew Lewis Carroll: even Mallarmé's Nursery Rhymes, which relate the story of Humpty Dumpty, depend upon other sources.

ELEVENTH SERIES OF NONSENSE

1. See Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Logicos, 8:133. "Blaurut" is an onomatopoeic which expresses a sound like that of the lyre; "shindaps" designates the machine or instrument.

2. This distinction corresponds to the two forms of nonsense proposed by Russell. See Franz Crahay, Le Formalisme logico-mathématique et le problème de non-sens (Paris: Belles-Lettres, 1957). The Russellian distinction seems to be preferable to the very general distinction proposed by Ruscelli in his Logical Investigations between "nonsense" and "counter-sense," and which inspires Koyré in Epiméthée le menteur (Paris: Hermann, n.d.), pp. 9ff.

3. See Lévi-Strauss' remarks with respect to the "zero phoneme" in "Introduction à l'oeuvre de Marcel Mauss" in M. Mauss, Sociologie et anthropologie, p. 50.

4. In pages which harmonize with the principal theses of Louis Althusser, J.-P. Osier proposes a distinction between those for whom meaning is to be recovered in a more or less lost origin (whether it be divine or human, ontological or anthropological), and those for whom the origin is a sort of nonsense, for whom meaning is always produced as an epistemological surface effect. Applying this criteria to Marx and Freud, Osier estimates that the problem of interpretation is not at all the problem of going from the "derived" to the "originary," but in comprehending the mechanisms of the production of sense in two series: sense is always an "effect." See preface to Feuerbach's L'Essence du christianisme (Paris: Maspero, 1968), especially pp. 15–19.

TWELFTH SERIES OF THE PARADOX


2. See Cicero, Academica, section 29. See also Kierkegaard's remarks in the Philosophical Fragments, which arbitrarily lend support to Carnéades.

THIRTEENTH SERIES OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC AND THE LITTLE GIRL

1. "Perspicaciteit" is a schizophrenic portmanteau word designating spirits which are held above the subject's head (perpendiculaire, perpendicular),

THIRTEENTH SERIES OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC 341


   “Il était roborant, et les violeurs tartaros
   Allaient en gibroyant et en brimbulbriquant
   Jusque là la la roughe est à roughe a rangmôde
   et rangmôde a rouarghambôde.
   Tous les fôlomitarde étaient les chats-luants
   Et les Ghôre-Ul’châts dans le Grабageument.”


5. Freud, “The Unconscious,” in *Metapsychology* (1915). Citing the cases of two patients, one of whom perceives his skin, and the other his sock, as systems of little holes which are in perpetual danger of becoming enlarged, Freud shows that this is a properly schizophrenic symptom which could not fit either a hysterical or an obsessional.


8. See in 8.4, 1948: “No mouth No tongue No teeth No larynx No esophagus No stomach No intestine No anus I shall reconstruct the man that I am.” (The body without organs is fashioned of bone and blood alone.)

9. See Wolfson, p. 53: in “derv’ya,” “the apostrophe between the palatalized v and the y represents what is called the soft sign, which in this word functions in such a manner that a complete consonant y is pronounced after the (palatalized) v: this phoneme would be palatalized in a certain manner without the soft sign, and as a result of the following soft vowel —here represented phonetically by yu and being written in Russian by a single character, having the form of a capital R back to front (pronounced dir’ya: the accent of intensity falls of course on the second syllable; the i open and brief; the d, r, and v palatalized or as if fused with a yod).” See also on p. 73 the schizophrenic’s commentary on the Russian word *bouDMi*.

10. In a very fine study, *Structuration dynamique dans la schizophrénie* (Bern: Verlag Hans Huber, 1956), Gisela Pankow has taken the examination of signs in schizophrenia very far. In connection with the cases related by Mrs. Pankow, special notice should be made of the analysis of fixed alimentary words which explode into phonetic bits: the word “CARAMELS,” for example, on p. 72. Also of particular interest is the dialectic of the container and contained, the discovery of polar opposition, and the theme of water and fire which is tied to it (pp. 77–69, 64, 69, 70); the curious invocation of fish as the sign of active revolt and of hot water as a sign of liberation (pp. 74–79); and the distinction of two bodies—the open and dissociated body of the man-flower, and the head without organs which serves its complement (pp. 69–72).

   It seems to us, however, that Mrs. Pankow’s interpretation minimizes the role of the head without organs. It also seems to us that the regime of signs lived in schizophrenia is comprehended, at the level beneath sense, only through the distinction between bodily signs-passions and corporeal signs-actions.

11. It is in this sense that, in Carroll, invention is essentially verbal, rather than syntactical or grammatical. As a consequence, portmanteau words can open up an infinity of possible interpretations by ramifying the series; nevertheless, syntactical rigor eliminates a certain number of these possibilities. The same holds true in Joyce, as Jean Paris has shown in *Tel Quel* (1967), no. 32, p. 64. The opposite is the case with Artaud, but only because there is no longer a problem of sense properly speaking.

---

**FOURTEENTH SERIES OF DOUBLE CAUSALITY**

1. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, 89: “The Stoics say that the body is a cause in the literal sense; but the incorporeal, in a metaphysical fashion, poses in the manner of a cause.”


3. Husserl, *Ideas* (New York: Collier Books, 1972), p. 348: “The X in the different acts or act-nomata furnished with a differing determining content is necessarily known as the same ...”; p. 365: “To every object that truly is there intrinsically corresponds (in the a priori of the unconditioned generality of the essence) the idea of a possible consciousness in which the object itself can be grasped in a primordial and also perfectly adequate way ...”; p. 366: “This continuum is more closely defined as infinite in all directions, consisting in all its phases of appearances of the same determinable X ...”


5. See J.-P. Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego* (New York: Noonday Press, 1957). The idea of an “impersonal or pre-personal” transcendent field, producing the I and the Ego, is of great importance. What hinders this