My overall takeaways from this week’s readings are scattered, but carry a similar theme of association and standards in language. I will first begin with C.S. Peirce’s examination of signs.
Attempting to dissect the origin of a thought is like asking whether the chicken or the egg came first – it’s an implausible task. C.S. Peirce asserts that all thoughts are a compilation and a translation of continuously growing signs.
Concepts we could not fathom of knowing in weeks, days or even hours can all be obtained through this link of symbol-filled thoughts. As Peirce says, “He makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, our outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is, observes what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to be discerned.” Peirce’s deciphering of symbolic connections and self-fulfillment is a testament to the journey of life and particularly the intellectual paths of those in CCT.
Clearly stated in Peirce’s theory is that a sign stands in place of an object, of which something is represented. As explained there are three categories of signs: likenesses, indications and symbols. Each distinction of signs has made its way into some of our most beloved family games: Likenesses is Charades, Indications is Pictionary and the most intriguing to me – Symbols – is Word Association. Symbols seem to be most explicitly contingent on prior exposures to a specific idea or image for correlation. The more narrowcast the symbol, the more refined the representation or interpretant– you say jazz, I think Davis and Coltrane; you say art, I think Basquiat and Banksy; you say CCT, I think deblackbox and Booeymonger’s. It feeds off of connections and mental prototypes. (It would be great if we can briefly grapple with this sign-representation-interpretant model for a better understanding.)
Thoughts, which are signs, are ultimately derivative of one another. However, I’m interested in how symbols come to be related to other signs. The element of branding for companies relates to this idea of semiology, just as much as artists – both musical and visual – have a signature. Emblems and pictorial signs serve as an optical trigger for consumers; some typographical fonts are specialized for companies, such as Cadillac’s cursive typeface or Popeye’s thick, rounded lettering. Musical artist Sia is known for her vibrant blonde bob hair and performing with her back to the audience – all of these are signs associated with a subject.
With Jakobson’s model of verbal communication, I questioned the effects of the frequent and evident sociolinguistic disconnect in academic settings. All components are present except aligning contexts and codes. The plight of many educators is to lessen this gap by reaching a midpoint for high academic standards and marginally well-rounded students. Also, the patterns of this symbolic ping-ponging are monitored closely and often inadequacies shove pupils into the categories of needing remedial attention. In this respect, the standards of verbal communication should be re-examined as not to stigmatize a linguistic standard or pattern that lies outside the margins of the typical code or context.
Finally, I want to place a cognitive bookmark on this excerpt from this week’s reading: “…Only the associations sanctioned by that language appears to us to conform to reality, and we disregard whatever others might be imagined.” The grammar, or rules, of a language is constricting. However, what does it say when such symbolic obstruction is shared by multiple grammars, as if a staple for universal grammar? Are these obstructions politically/socially enforced?